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Abstract
Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) has become the new norm
in enterprise networks, but BYOD security remains a top
concern. Context-aware security, which enforces access con-
trol based on dynamic runtime context, holds much promise.
Recent work has developed SDN solutions to collect device
context for network-wide access control in a central controller.
However, the central controller poses a bottleneck that can
become an attack target, and processing context changes at
remote software has low agility.
We present a new paradigm, programmable in-network
security (Poise), which is enabled by the emergence of pro-
grammable switches. At the heart of Poise is a novel switch
primitive, which can be programmed to support a wide range
of context-aware policies in hardware. Users of Poise spec-
ify concise policies, and Poise compiles them into different
instantiations of the security primitive in P4. Compared to cen-
tralized SDN defenses, Poise is resilient to control plane satu-
ration attacks, and it dramatically increases defense agility.
1 Introduction
BYOD refers to the practice where enterprise employees
could use privately owned tablets, phones, and laptops at
work [30]. This practice has become the new norm in many
organizations [8,14,15,18,21,27], and its market is projected
to grow and exceed $73 billion by 2021 [18].
One of the top concerns, however, is BYOD security. As
BYOD devices are generally less well managed than their
enterprise counterparts, they are easier targets to compro-
mise [7, 9, 49, 108]. This is further exacerbated by the fact
that such devices are used to access sensitive enterprise re-
sources as well as untrustworthy services in the wild [5, 20].
At its core, BYOD security represents a concrete instance of
a fundamental challenge, sometimes known as the “end node
problem” [12, 13]. The “end nodes” are not subject to the
same level of centralized control, management, and protec-
tion as the enterprise infrastructure—we can easily update the
access control lists on the gateway router, or patch newly dis-
covered vulnerabilities on a server, but ensuring that scattered
end points are properly patched is much more difficult. As
such, insecure end devices tend to become the weakest link
in the security chain [23].
One promising approach to BYOD security is to use
context-aware policies, which enforce access control based
on devices’ runtime context [62]. For instance, a policy may
deny access from devices whose TLS libraries have not been
updated [105], or grant access to devices that are physically
located in the enterprise boundary [95], or only allow the use
of a sensitive service only if administrators are online [59,94].
In each of these scenarios, we desire to make security deci-
sions based on additional “threat signals”, such as the device
location, library version, or even the status of other devices
in the network. Context-aware policies are in a class of their
own—they are much more dynamic, as context can change fre-
quently (e.g., GPS location), and they require global visibility
of the entire network (e.g., administrators online).
Supporting context-aware policies in enterprise networks
presents interesting research challenges. Some traditional sys-
tems operate at the server side [96,101], which enables easier
management and update of security policies; others operate at
the client side [98], making it easier to access device context
as threat signals. A common limitation, however, is that the
individual nodes—clients or servers—only have local visi-
bility, and such a “tunnel vision” hinders the ability to make
synchronized security decisions network-wide [83]. Latest
proposals address this using centralized SDN, where a soft-
ware controller collects context signals from all devices and
enforces network-wide access control policies [62]. However,
the central controller is vulnerable to control plane satura-
tion attacks [90], and responding to threat signals in remote
software incurs delay and decreases agility.
Our contribution. We present a novel design called Poise,
or programmable in-network security, whose goal is to ad-
dress the limitations of centralized SDN defense. Instead of
collecting and processing context signals at a remote software
controller, we design a new security primitive that runs in
switch hardware. This primitive can extract context signals
from client traffic and change defense postures at hardware
speeds, while maintaining full linespeed (100Gbps per switch
port) packet processing. Moreover, it can be re-programmed
by a declarative language to support a wide range of context-
aware policies. This is achieved by interposing a policy com-
piler, which can compile policies to different instantiations
of the security primitive. Compared to centralized SDN de-
fenses [62,81,90], Poise enforces context-aware security with-
out software processing at remote controllers, resulting in one-
of-a-kind defenses that are efficient, programmable, highly
agile, and resilient to control plane saturation attacks [90].
The key enabler for Poise is the emerging programmable
data planes in latest networking technology. New switches,
such as Intel FlexPipe [17], Cavium XPliant [10], and Bare-
foot Tofino [4], can be programmed in P4 [19] to support user-
defined network protocols, custom header processing, and
sophisticated state in hardware. P4 networks represent a ma-
jor step beyond OpenFlow-based SDN: OpenFlow switches
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have fixed-function hardware, and they can only support pro-
grammable forwarding by parsimoniously invoking remote
software controllers; but P4 switches offer unprecedented
programmability that we can apply to every single packet
without performance compromise. The novelty of Poise lies
in leveraging the new hardware features for context-aware
security—we encode context signals with user-defined pro-
tocols, make access control decisions using programmable
packet processing, and support network-wide security policies
by designing hardware data structures.
After describing more background in §2, we present:
• The concept of programmable in-network security (§3);
• A language and compiler for context-aware policies (§4);
• A novel in-network security primitive, Poise (§5);
• The Poise orchestration service and device module (§6);
• Prototype and evaluation of Poise that demonstrate its
practicality, as well as its higher resilience to control
plane saturation attacks and increased defense agility
compared with OpenFlow-based defense (§7);
We then describe related work in §8, and conclude in §9.
2 Background
Context-aware security (CAS) stands in stark contrast to con-
ventional security mechanisms—existing mechanisms can
only support static policies, but CAS uses dynamic policies
based on runtime context. For instance, NAC (Network Ac-
cess Control) mechanisms such as IEEE 802.1x [31] and
Cisco ACL [24] statically configure access control policies
for a device or an IP prefix, respectively. Role- or attribute-
based access control mechanisms [55, 56, 82] also regulate
access based on statically defined roles or attributes. CAS,
on the other hand, uses the broader context of a request as
threat signals (e.g., location/time of access, the status of the
network), and whenever the signals change, the security pos-
ture would adapt accordingly. The theoretical underpinnings
of CAS have been studied more than a decade back [43], and
it recently found an array of new applications in securing IoT
and mobile devices [41,54,62,65,98]. These devices, just like
the BYOD clients in our scenario, suffer from the “end node
problem” [12, 13]. CAS has proven to be effective for such
scenarios, because it can enable a more precise protection
based on threat signals collected from the end nodes.
2.1 Design space
The concept of CAS by itself does not necessitate a client-,
server-, or network-based design; rather, these design points
have pros and cons. First off, purely server-side solutions are
often ineffective, as we desire to collect context signals from
client devices at runtime. Therefore, typical CAS systems [62,
98] need to install a context collection module at the clients
to collect context signals. In terms of policy enforcement, one
could co-locate enforcement with context collection, resulting
in a purely client-based solution [98]. The main drawbacks,
however, are that a) individual devices only have local views,
making network-wide decisions hard to come by, and that b)
policy management is much harder, as policies are distributed
to each device; this might raise additional concerns if some
policies are themselves sensitive data.
The latest response from the security community is to
use network-based designs using a centralized SDN con-
troller [62]. The policy enforcement module runs as an “SDN
app” in a remote controller, which collects context signals
from all devices and enforces access control in a centralized
manner. This enables a network-wide view for holistic protec-
tion, and enables centralized policy management. The design
of Poise adopts similar security principles, although it has a
key difference—the policy enforcement module runs in data
plane hardware, rather than control plane software.
2.2 Trust model
Poise adopts the same trust model from existing CAS solu-
tions [62, 98]. Although existing solutions (and Poise) pri-
marily focus on Android devices, the conceptual designs are
generally applicable.
CAS modules. The context collection and policy enforce-
ment modules are trusted. The former runs in client devices,
and the latter may run at the client side (e.g., DeepDroid [98]),
as an SDN app (e.g., PBS [62]), or inside the switch (Poise).
The context collection module can be installed as a privileged
module on Android devices with OEM support, which is a
common practice in Enterprise Mobility Management (EMM)
solutions [6, 25, 29, 98]. This module is only activated when
devices connect to the enterprise network with user consent,
which is supported by standard BYOD frameworks such as
the work profile in Android for Work [2] or containers in
Knox [22]. Users can install their favorite apps; some of these
may be malicious and are the goal of CAS protection. We also
adopt the assumptions from existing work [62, 98] that mali-
cious apps cannot compromise the kernel or obtain root privi-
leges, i.e., the Android kernel and firmware are trusted. While
it is possible to relax these assumptions using trusted hard-
ware [26, 28, 80] or privilege separation techniques [50, 87],
these are an orthogonal line of work.
Authentication. Resource authorization mechanisms like
Poise and PBS [62] are also orthogonal to the choice of
authentication techniques. Common practices in enterprise
networks, such as the SAE (simultaneous authentication of
equals) protocol [60] in WPA3 [102], or two-factor authenti-
cation using TOTP [77], are compatible. Only authenticated
devices can further access enterprise resources under CAS.
Context integrity and privacy. Network-based designs,
such as PBS [62] and Poise, require context signals to be sent
to the network. The integrity and privacy of context packets
are subjected to the same level of protection as normal traf-
fic. Communication between client devices and access points
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could be protected by WPA3 [102], which encrypts traffic
and prevents masquerading or replay attacks. Communication
between access points and the enterprise network, as well
as within the network, could be protected by MACsec [16],
which encrypts traffic at the Ethernet layer and is supported by
commodity off-the-shelf switches, such as Aruba 200 [3] and
Cisco Nexus 3400 [11] (the latter is P4-programmable). Poise
switches drop context packets immediately after processing
them, so they will not be propagated further.
3 Programmable In-Network Security
This section describes why traditional network cannot support
CAS, how OpenFlow-based SDN provides a partial solution,
and how Poise can leverage programmable data planes to
achieve a new design.
3.1 Traditional networks are not enough
One natural place for implementing network access control is
on network devices, e.g., switches or middleboxes. However,
this is infeasible because traditional devices are customized
for specific purposes, and they cannot be re-programmed to
support new functions, such as a diverse set of CAS poli-
cies. For instance, switches speak TCP/IP, but they cannot
understand context information, such as GPS location, time
of access, or library versions. We could in principle deploy
specialized middleboxes, but such devices are blackbox in
nature and unamenable to change—policy updates would
be constrained by the speed of hardware upgrades, which
is much slower than the speed needed for changing security
postures. As a result, traditional in-network security mecha-
nisms merely provide fixed-function security, such as static ac-
cess control lists, firewalls, traffic filters, and and deep packet
inspection (DPI). There is a fundamental gap between the
dynamic nature of CAS and the static network devices.
3.2 How about OpenFlow-based SDN?
Software-defined networking (SDN), a concept first proposed
a decade ago [72], has now become a reality. Commercial de-
ployments of SDNs are already in large scale—exemplary net-
works include Microsoft’s SWAN [61] and Google’s B4 [64].
SDN networks offer control plane programmability by the
use of a software controller, which can be implemented in
general-purpose programming languages (e.g., OpenDaylight
[36]/Beacon [33] in Java, POX [34] in Python, and NOX [32]
in C++). Although the OpenFlow switch hardware remains
fixed in function, they can send PacketIn messages to the
central controller for programmable decisions. Control plane
programmability underlies many recent developments in net-
work security [62, 81, 84, 88–90]. In particular, PBS [62] uses
a centralized SDN controller for context-aware security.
However, in traditional SDN, programmability comes at
a great cost, as it resides in a centralized software controller.
First, PacketIn messages incur a round-trip delay between
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Figure 1: P4 switches are programmable in hardware. Packets
first go through a programmable parser, which supports user-
defined protocols. Packet headers are then streamed through a
number of hardware stages, each of which contains registers
in memory, arithmetic logic units (ALUs), and match/action
tables. Packets can be recirculated to go through the stages
multiple times to trigger different programmable elements.
the switch and the remote controller, whereas packets on the
data plane fast path are directly processed at hardware speeds.
As such, we can only programmatically process a small set of
packets—typically one packet per flow (e.g., the first packet).
Second, traditional SDNs are vulnerable to control plane satu-
ration attacks [90], where an adversary can cause high-volume
traffic to be sent to the software controller. A recent work
OFX [92] has further highlighted that, for security applica-
tions that require dynamic, fine-grained decisions, centralized
SDN defenses would pose a severe bottleneck. The key goal
of Poise is to address the limitations of centralized SDN de-
fense by enforcing CAS in switch hardware.
3.3 Opportunity: Programmable data planes
Data plane programmability represents the latest step in the
networking community. In contrast to OpenFlow-based SDN,
P4 networks are programmable in hardware. Figure 1 illus-
trates the new features of programmable data planes. The key
novelty of Poise is to leverage these features for security.
1. Customized header support for CAS. First, they can
recognize customized protocols and headers beyond TCP/IP
via the use of a programmable parser, without the need for
hardware upgrades. Our observation is that this allows us
to programmatically define context signals as special header
fields, and embed them to network traffic. P4 switches can
directly parse context signals from client traffic.
2. Linespeed processing for fastpath security decisions.
Second, each hardware stage is integrated with ALUs (Arith-
metic Logic Units) that can perform computation over header
fields at linespeed. The implication for security is that, without
involving a remote software controller, switches can evalu-
ate context headers (e.g., GPS locations) and make security
decisions (e.g., location-based access control) on the fast path.
3. Cross-packet state for network-wide security. Last
but not least, the hardware stages also have persistent memory
in read/write registers, and they can process packets based
on persistent state. We observe that this enables the network
to make coordinated security decisions in a network-wide
manner—decisions for one client could depend on past net-
work behaviors, or activities from other parts of the network.
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Figure 2: Poise compiles a high-level policy into a) switch
programs, and b) device configurations, and enforces the pol-
icy inside the network.
These hardware features are programmable in P4 [19, 45].
Switch programs can be compiled and installed from the
switch control plane (Figure 1), which typically runs a cus-
tomized version of Linux and has general-purpose CPUs. The
P4 compiler maps a switch program to the available hardware
resources [69]: programs that successfully compile on a target
are guaranteed to run at linespeed, due to the pipelined nature
of the hardware; programs that exceed available hardware
resources would be rejected by the P4 compiler.
3.4 Poise overview
Consider the enterprise network shown in Figure 2, which
hosts several types of private data, such as employee records
and sales records, and also provides connectivity to the Inter-
net. The operator wants to enforce dynamic access control of
sensitive enterprise data in the presence of BYOD clients. In-
stead of traditional, password-based access control, the policy
might additionally specify that a) sales records should only
be accessed by devices belonging to the sales department; b)
during regular work hours; c) from devices that are properly
patched to address some recently discovered vulnerability;
and, d) a device can only access the sales records if the sales
manager is online. Poise is designed for advanced enterprise
security policies such as these.
At the heart of Poise is a novel switch primitive that
achieves context-aware, linespeed, in-network security on
programmable data planes. The design of this primitive also
tackles a practical challenge in P4 programming. Since P4
programs specify low-level packet processing behaviors, they
are akin to “microcode” programming and fairly challeng-
ing to write. Moreover, one often needs to hand-optimize
P4 programs, e.g., merging multiple match/action tables, to
reduce resource usage. Therefore, we allow network opera-
tors to specify context-aware security policies in a declarative
language that is much higher-level than P4. Our Poise com-
piler can then generate optimized P4 programs to enforce the
policies. These programs are different instantiations of the
security primitive, which can make policy-specific decisions.
The Poise compiler also generates configurations for the con-
text collection module, which runs in Android clients as a
pre-positioned kernel module. It collects context signals based
on the configuration, and sends out periodic context packets
to the network. Policy changes can be easily supported by a
reconfiguration. Client configurations may not be affected by
policy updates, unless the new policies require new types of
context signals to be collected.
Next, we first describe how Poise presents a declarative
policy interface, and how Poise compiles the key policy con-
structs in §4. We then describe the programmable Poise prim-
itive in §5, and the client module in §6.
4 The Poise Language and Compiler
The policy language in Poise is inspired by the Frenetic fam-
ily of SDN programming languages [40, 57, 74, 75, 86], but
we adapt them a) from an OpenFlow setting to P4, which sup-
ports richer header operations and state, and b) from a network
management setting to security, by supporting security con-
text. Specifically, we have designed the Poise language based
on Pyretic NetCore [75], which models network policies as a
series of match/action statements. In terms of the semantics
of the language, a policy represents a function that maps an in-
coming packet to zero (i.e., drop), one (i.e., unicast), or more
(i.e., multicast) outgoing packets1. A policy could be as simple
as drop, which drops all packets, although practically, the pol-
icy would make a decision based on the context a packet car-
ries, such as if match(dip==66.220.144.0) then drop,
which blacklists a block of destination IP addresses, or if
match(0800<=time<=1800) then drop, which denies ac-
cess depending on the time of day. Figure 3 summarizes the
language syntax, and the highlighted portions show the differ-
ences from NetCore, which we explain more below.
4.1 Key language constructs
Security context. Poise supports CAS by allowing custom
definitions of security context, such as the time field men-
tioned above, and the dev field mentioned later. Poise treats
such context as special header fields with a default 32-bit
width, although the field sizes can be further specified by the
policy programmer for customization. When a policy refers to
multiple types of context, Poise structures the context headers
in the order in which they appear in the policy program.
Context operations. Poise also supports sophisticated opera-
tions over context headers, as indicated in the expressions and
predicates in Figure 3. An expression could be a constant, an
arithmetic operation over header fields, or a complex expres-
sion over subexpressions. Security decisions are made based
on predicates over expressions, where the ◦ operator indicates
comparisons such as >, <, and so on. Context can also be
tested against global, constant lists, which are pre-defined
in the policy to encode membership relations. For instance,
one could define a list of devices with administrative roles
as def adminlst = ["dev1", "dev2"]. Then, the policy
1We refer interested readers to [57] for a more formal treatment of the
Frenetic language semantics.
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Primitive Actions
A ::= drop | fwd(port) | flood | log
Expressions
E ::= v | e1+ e2 | e1− e2| e1 ∗ e2 | M
Constant Lists
L ::= [v]
Predicates
match(h in l) | P&P | (P|P) | !P
Monitors
M ::= count(P)
Policies
C ::= A | if P then C else C | (C|C)
Figure 3: The language syntax for Poise policies. Context
fields are represented as h. Expressions are represented as e,
or v (constants). The ◦ operator indicates comparisons.
could refer to the lists as part of the decision-making process,
such as if match(!dev in adminlst) then fwd(mbox),
which forwards traffic from non-admin devices to a middle-
box for traffic scrubbing. We note that the original NetCore
does not support the use of context or sophisticated context
operations; rather, Poise adds such extensions based on the
extra processing power in P4 for security support.
Stateful monitors. Unlike NetCore, Poise supports stateful
policies which make security decisions based on network-
wide state. This is done via a monitor expression, which mon-
itors activities of interest and maintains state for decision
making. A monitor expression is written as count(pred),
which counts the number of packets that satisfy the pred-
icate pred in the current time window; for instance,
count(match(is_admin)) counts the number of packets
generated from a device with an administrative role. The
counters are periodically reset to zero when a new time win-
dow begins. These monitors enable programmers to write
network-wide policies, where the processing of a packet de-
pends on not only its own context, but also the context of
other traffic. This is different from stateless NetCore policies,
where monitors passively collect traffic statistics, but do not
affect how forwarding decisions will be made.
Actions. The final decision of a Poise policy is represented
by its action field. Currently, Poise supports four types of
actions. The drop decision denies access. The fwd decision
allows access, and can be further parameterized by an outgo-
ing switch port, so that it can actuate further processing—e.g.,
sending packets through an DPI device that can be reached
via a particular port. The flood decision broadcasts a packet.
The log decision sends a packet to a logger that detects po-
tentially suspicious activity; this is achieved by aliasing the
fwd decision and specifying a special port for the local switch
CPU. Packets sent for logging will be pumped to the control
plane of the switch, which maintains a logger. This can be
easily generalized to enable remote logging, e.g., by wrapping
the packet inside another IP header, where the destination IP
represents a network activity logger.
Composing policies. Similar as NetCore, Poise can compose
multiple policies P1|P2|...|Pn and compile them into a
single switch program. This is useful, e.g., when Pi and Pj
check different context signals and the enterprise wants to
apply them in combination. The Poise compiler rejects the
composition of conflicting policies at compilation time.
4.2 Example policies
The Poise language is expressive enough to capture a wide
range of existing and new policies, and it is much more con-
cise than low-level languages such as P4. Next, we describe
seven practical BYOD policies, where the first two are adapted
from existing work [62] and the rest are new policies sup-
ported by Poise. Variables dev, time, lat, lon, and usr are
customized header fields.
P1: Block certain services in work hours [62]: A com-
mon BYOD policy is to block access from certain devices to
entertainment websites during work hours:
def businesslst = ["dev1", "dev2"]
if match(dip==66.220.144.0 &
dev in businesslst &
(time >=0800)&(time <=1800))
then drop
P2: Direct traffic from guest devices through a middle-
box [62]: Another useful policy is to distinguish traffic from
authorized devices and guest devices, and direct guest traffic
through a middlebox for traffic scrubbing:
def authlst = ["dev1", "dev2"]
if match(dev in authlst)
then fwd(server)
else fwd(mbox)
New policies. There are also useful policies in Poise that
cannot be easily supported in traditional networks; they are
implementable in Poise due to the use of programmable data
planes, which can perform arithmetic operations over context
headers, and maintain network-wide state to make coordi-
nated security decisions. We give an example of each below.
P3: Distance-based access control: This policy grants ac-
cess to a service only if the user is within a certain distance
from a physical location (e.g., the server room); this requires
performing arithmetic operations over GPS coordinates em-
bedded in the packet header:
if ((lat -x)*(lat -x)+(lon -y)*(lon -y) < D)
then fwd(server)
else drop
P4: Allow access only if admin is online: Poise can support
coordinated, network-wide policies by monitoring security
events of interest and making decisions based on the result.
For instance, a policy might grant access to a service only if
the admin is online:
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def adminlst = ["Bob", "Alice"]
c = count(match(usr in adminlst))
if match(c>0) then fwd(server)
Advanced policies. Inspired by the literature of “continuous
authentication” [39, 51, 52, 99], we propose a set of advanced
policies that use device context to detect subtle but important
indicators of potential attacks. Due to space constraints, we
only describe the high-level policies, but not the programs. P5:
Block requests without explicit user interaction, which denies
access to a sensitive service if all apps are running in the back-
ground and there is no user interaction with the touchscreen
to trigger the request; such requests are likely generated by
malware. P6: Scrub traffic if UIs are overlapping, which for-
wards traffic through a middlebox if the context information
shows that app UIs are overlapping—a potential sign for UI
hijacking [58]. P7: Conduct deep packet inspection if cam-
era/recorder is on, which detects if sensitive information is
being leaked through an active camera/recorder app [38].
4.3 Compilation
Next, we discuss how the Poise compiler processes the key
language constructs and generates P4 implementations.
Compiling security context. The Poise compiler generates
custom header definitions for each security context in a pol-
icy program. If a policy uses multiple types of context, the
compiler generates a stack of headers defined in P4 in the
order they are used. Context packets have special transport-
layer protocol numbers, and context headers appear right after
transport-layer headers. Poise does not modify normal traffic
headers. As a concrete example, Figure 4(a) shows the gener-
ated P4 snippets for the gps header with two fields: latitude
and longitude.
Compiling context operations. The Poise compiler distin-
guishes between five classes of context operations: arithmetic
operations, bitwise operations, comparisons, context matches,
and membership tests. The first three classes are simpler to
handle, as they can be directly translated into their P4 coun-
terparts; the latter two require the compiler to generate ad-
ditional code components in P4. First off, all context fields
are compiled into header definitions and references to these
headers, as discussed above. Then, for arithmetic, bitwise, or
comparison operations over header fields, such as lat*lat,
sensors&0x01, or time<10, our compiler forms expressions
using the corresponding P4 operations over the headers. For
arithmetic operations, the current P4 specification supports ad-
dition, subtraction, and multiplication, which are all supported
by the Poise compiler. Notably missing from the list are di-
vision and modulo operations, which tend to be expensive to
implement in switch hardware, although sometimes they can
be approximated by bit shifts if the divisor is a power of two.
If a Poise program involves operations unimplementable in
P4, our compiler would reject the policy during compilation.
As an example, Figure 4(b) shows the P4 snippets that
our compiler generates for computing the distance between
a pair of GPS coordinates to a pre-defined center (assumed
to be (0,0)). Our compiler also generates conditional state-
ments based on the policy, e.g., if-else branches to test
if the distance exceeds a threshold. Context operations are
performed within an apply block at the control Ingress,
which means the switch ingress pipeline.
Context matches, on the other hand, are compiled into
match/action tables in P4. A match can be an exact match,
which requires matching a context field against a list of keys
bit by bit. It could be a lpm match, which hits on the key that
shares the longest prefix. A match could also be ternary,
which allows wildcards in the match keys. Ternary matches
are performed on TCAM (Ternary Content Addressable Mem-
ory), which is scarce switch resource. Poise policy program-
mers do not have to specify which types of matches to use;
rather, the compiler picks the best implementation for the pol-
icy. Typically, context matches are performed against a user-
specified constant list that defines membership, e.g., a set of
devices owned by the sales department. For a list with k items
[a1, a2,· · ·, ak], our compiler will construct a match/ac-
tion table with k entries, where each entry corresponds to an
item in the list. The actions associated with the entries depend
on the mode of access defined in the policy program.
For instance, consider the P4 snippet in Figure 4(c), which
shows a match/action table generated according to a constant
list of two entries: Bob and Alice. The table implements an
exact match on the device ID field. If the context match
is successful, then the device will be granted access to an
enterprise resource; unsuccessful matches indicate that the
context fails the membership test, and needs to be denied
access. Given that match/action tables consume most of the
physical memory on chip, the compiler performs optimiza-
tions for table layouts to minimize memory usage.
Compiling stateful monitors. The Poise compiler generates
a read/write register for each stateful monitor in the policy, as
well as code components for detecting monitored events and
updating the monitor values. Such monitors are implemented
as a number of registers in P4, which are supported by SRAM
on the switch. Updates to the registers are linespeed, so they
can be performed on a per-packet basis. Specifically, for each
incoming packet, the generated code checks whether this cor-
responds to an event of interest, using either a context match,
or a match over a membership list. If this event should be
monitored, the code additionally updates the monitor register
and records the event timestamp. If a long time has elapsed
after the previous event took place, then this register is cleared
to indicate that the monitored event is absent. As discussed
before, monitors enable network-wide policies that make co-
ordinated security decisions—a policy can test if a monitor is
active, and make decisions accordingly.
Concretely, the snippet in Figure 4(d) shows an example.
It instantiates a 32-bit register to hold the monitor value, and
updates the register when the admin context is active in a
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header gps_t {
bit<32> lat;
bit<32> lon;
} //ctxt def.
struct headers {
ethernet_t ether;
ipv4_t     ipv4;
tcp_t tcp;
gps_t gps;
} //ctxt stack def.
control Ingress {
//switch ingress def.
apply {
bit<32> d;
d=lat^2+lon^2;
if (d < thresh)
fwd (1)
else
drop
} //context operations
…
}
//part of control Ingress.
table admin {
key = {dev: exact}
actions = {allow, deny}
const entries = {
“Bob”: allow
”Alice”: allow
} //other users denied
}
…
apply(admin)
//part of control Ingress
register<32> monitor;
register<32> ts;
if (admin.isValid()) {
//update monitor result
monitor++; 
} else if (NOW-ts > timeo){
//timeout
monitor=0;
}
ts = NOW;
(a)	Security	context (b)	Context	operations (c)	Constant	lists	+	membership	tests (d)	Network-wide	monitors
Figure 4: The Poise compiler processes the key language constructs and generates P4 implementations. The P4 snippets shown
are simplified for clarity of presentation. For instance, in (b), the instantiation of the thresh register is not shown; in (d), the
timestamp of a packet is obtained via the ingress_global_timestamp field instead of a variable called NOW.
packet. The code associates a timestamp to this monitor, and
resets the monitor upon timeout.
Compiling actions. An action is attached to each packet to
represent the final decision made on its context. In P4, deci-
sions are represented by attaching special metadata fields to a
packet, which will be recognized and processed by a traffic
manager, which schedules packets to be sent on the correct
outgoing port(s) or dropped. Logging a packet is achieved by
setting the outgoing port to be the switch CPU.
Optimizations. Programmable data planes have three types
of notable constraints. Stages: There is a fixed number of
hardware stages, and a packet can only match against one
single context table per stage. Tables: A single stage can only
hold a fixed number of tables. Memory: Each stage has a
limited amount of memory.
The Poise compiler performs three types of optimizations,
which are particularly useful when composing multiple poli-
cies. (a) If multiple policies check against the same context
signal, our compiler will perform table deduplication to elimi-
nate redundant context tables and save memory. (b) If policies
use many small tables, Poise will perform table merge to re-
duce the number of needed tables. (c) If a policy performs
more context checks than the number of available stages,
Poise will collapse the policy by recirculating context pack-
ets to traverse the stages multiple times, triggering different
tables at each recirculation. This creates the illusion of a larger
number of stages with slightly increased latency.
Summary. So far, we have described the basic compilation
algorithm as if each packet is tagged with context information.
This makes it easy for a switch to access a packet’s context
without keeping state, but it results in high traffic overhead.
Next, we will relax this assumption by the design of a stateful,
efficient, programmable in-network security primitive.
5 The In-Network Security Primitive
At the core of Poise is a novel security primitive that is highly
dynamic, efficient, and programmable.
Goal: A dynamic and efficient security primitive. The in-
network primitive should ideally allow the level of protection
to be adjusted between per-packet and per-flow granularities,
by supporting a tunable frequency of context packets for each
connection. At one end of the spectrum, per-flow granularity
of protection degenerates into a static security mechanism
that does not support context changes within a connection.
Thus the protection is very coarse-grained, especially for long-
lived connections that persist for an extended period of time
(e.g., push-based mobile services, such as email [100]). At the
other end, per-packet granularity is extremely fine-grained, but
may incur unnecessary resource waste unless context changes
from packet to packet. As a concrete example, if there are
20 context fields across policies, then each client needs to
send 20×4/500 = 16% extra traffic, assuming typical 500-
byte packets and 4-byte context fields. The Poise primitive
supports a property that we call subflow-level security, which
achieves a tunable tradeoff between security granularity and
overhead when enforcing context-aware security.
Property: Subflow-level security. We can state our desired
property more formally below. Consider a sequence of packets
in the same flow ci, pi1 , · · · , pik ,ci+1, where c represents a
context packet and p a data packet. Subflow-level security
requires that decisions made on the context packet ci should
be applied to subsequent data packets pi j , i j ∈ [i1, ik], but fresh
decisions should be made for data packets that follow ci+1.
The decision granularity can be tuned by f , the frequency of
context packets. This results in an overhead of s · f , where s
is the size of context packets. For instance, assuming 80-byte
context packets and a frequency of one context packet per ten
seconds, the overhead would be as low as 8 bytes per second.
Challenges. Designing a primitive that supports subflow-
level security, however, requires tackling three key challenges.
(a) Keeping per-flow state requires a prohibitive amount of
memory, but the SRAM of a modern switch is on the order of
10MB. Therefore, Poise approximates per-flow state using a
on-chip key/value store. (b) Buffering control plane updates is
necessary for handling new flows. Although context changes
can be entirely handled by the data plane, new flows require
installing match/action entries from the switch CPU, which
takes time. Before updates are fully populated, Poise uses
another hardware data structure akin to a cache to make con-
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Key (3-tuple) Val
10.0.0.2:22:TCP 1
10.0.0.9:80:UDP 2
10.0.0.7:ff:TCP 0
10.0.0.6:80:UDP 3
Idx Decision
0 1	(Allow)
1 0	(Drop)
2 1	(Allow)
3 2	(DPI)
M/A	tables
FullConn Decision
Hash 3-tuple	 Decision	
0xFE32 10.0.0.1:80:TCP 0	(Drop)
0x88EA 10.0.0.2:22:TCP 1	(Allow)
0xBC42 10.0.0.7:52:UDP 1	(Allow)
0x4A52 10.0.0.9:A7:UDP 2	(DPI)
Cache
Registers
Figure 5: The key/value store with example entries.
servative decisions for buffered flows. (c) Mitigating DoS
attacks that could arise due to the interaction between data
and control planes. This defends against malicious clients that
craft special context packets to degrade the performance of
selected clients or even the entire network. In the next three
subsections, we detail each of these techniques.
5.1 Approximating per-flow state
The key problem in the first challenge stems from the fact
that the switch needs to process data packets without context
attached to them. Therefore, when a switch processes a con-
text packet, it needs to remember the decision and apply it to
subsequent data packets in the same connection, until the next
context packet refreshes the decision. A naïve design would
require keeping per-flow state on the switch. This is infeasible
because modern networks have large numbers of concurrent
flows (about 10 million [73]). Keeping per-flow state requires
about 140 MB switch SRAM (13-byte flow ID/five tuple,
1-byte decision for each flow), which exceeds the memory
capacity of the latest switch hardware (50-100 MB) [73].
To address this, Poise approximates per-flow state using a
key/value store consisting of two data structures, FullConn
and Decision, as shown in Figure 5. The FullConn schema
is [sip, sport, proto]→idx. The match key is the
source IP/port and protocol for the client, and the value is an
index to a register array R. The indexed register R[idx] holds
the decision made on the latest context packet within this
connection, and it can be refreshed entirely on the data plane.
Insertions to this key/value store require control plane involve-
ment, but they are relatively infrequent and only needed for
new connections. Since the match key does not include the
destination IP/port, this introduces some inaccuracy when a
client reuses a source port across connections. Therefore, for
short-lived connections, data packets may see slightly out-
dated decisions. To ensure that such inaccuracy does not mis-
classify a deny decision as an allow, we blacklist the source IP
addresses that have recently violated the enterprise policy: all
connections from these clients would be blocked temporarily.
DecisionFullConn
BF
Switch Control Plane
Cache
Miss
Evicted deny entry 
Insert new connection
Context 
packet in Make BYOD
decision
Hit: update decision
Match-action tables
Stateful registers
Update 
Cache
(a) The logic for processing context packets
DecisionFullConn
BF
Cache
Miss
Hit
Data packet in
Collision 
Miss: recirculate
Hit
Drop
Enforce BYOD
decision
Drop
Hit
Miss
(b) The logic for processing data packets
Figure 6: Poise uses a combination of match/action tables and
stateful registers to process context and data packets.
5.2 Buffering control plane updates
Insertions to FullConn requires control plane involvement, so
they take much longer than updating policy decisions for an
existing connection. As a result, when data packets in a new
connection arrive at the switch, the FullConn match/action
table may not have been populated by the corresponding
entry yet. To address this, Poise uses a level of indirection
by creating a small hardware Cache to buffer decisions for
pending table updates, which resides on the data plane and
can be updated at linespeed. All decisions in Cache are up-to-
date, since writes to this cache are immediately effective, but
this table has a smaller capacity. The FullConn table takes
more time to update, but it holds more connections.
The cache design. As shown in Figure 5, Cache has a
fixed number of entries. Our implementation uses 216 entries,
which corresponds to the output size of a CRC-16 hash func-
tion. Each entry is of the form h→[sip,sport,proto,dec],
where h is the CRC hash of the flow’s three tuple, i.e.,
h=CRC(sip,sport,proto), and dec is the decision made
based on the context packet. The size of Cache is 216× (7+
1)=0.38 MB memory. When Poise receives a context packet
from a new connection (Figure 6a), it immediately adds the
entry to Cache, and then invokes the control plane API to
insert the match/action entry in FullConn. Since CRC func-
tions are not collision resistant, different connections may
be mapped to the same entry, and hence we evict old entries
upon collision. When a data packet comes in (Figure 6b),
Poise first matches it against the FullConn table and applies
the decision upon success. If there is no entry for this packet,
then Poise indexes the Cache table instead. Upon a cache
hit, the corresponding decision is applied to the data packet.
Upon a cache miss, one of two situations has happened: a)
the switch has not seen a context packet from this client, or b)
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the entry for this client has been evicted due to the collision.
Poise distinguishes between these cases using the following
cache eviction algorithm.
Handling cache evictions. Upon collision, we always re-
place the existing entry with the new one. This is because
Poise has already invoked the control plane to install the cor-
responding entry in FullConn, which will complete in time.
Therefore, if a packet does not match any entry in FullConn
and experiences a collision in Cache, we use a special instruc-
tion to recirculate the packet inside the data plane to delay its
processing. Recirculated packets are sent back to the switch
ingress to be matched against the FullConn table one more
time. This recirculation is repeated up to k times, where k
is chosen to be larger than the expected time for the control
plane to populate an entry. If a packet has reached this thresh-
old, and the FullConn table still has not been populated. Then
we consider this to be case a) above, and drop the packet.
Early denies. To reduce the amount of recirculated packets,
we make early decisions to drop a packet if its context is
evaluated to a “deny”. Specifically, when evicting an entry
from Cache, we add its source IP address into a blacklist
Bloom filter (BF in Figure 6) if the decision is to drop. Source
addresses in BF represent devices that have violated the policy
recently and need to be blacklisted for a period of time. If a
packet cannot find an entry in either Cache or FullConn, but
hits BF, we drop it without recirculation. Since Bloom filters
can only produce false positives, but never false negatives, we
will always correctly reject an illegal connection. However, we
might err on the conservative side and reject legal connections
as well, if the BF produces a false positive. This is a rare
case, however, as this will only happen during the window in
which FullConn has not been populated, the Cache entry has
been evicted, and the BF happens to produce a false positive.
Nevertheless, Poise periodically clears this Bloom filter to
reduce false positive rates, which grow with the number of
contained elements. When the BF is being cleared, packets
will be recirculated until the operation completes.
5.3 Handling denial-of-service attacks
Since Poise requires extra processing inside the network, we
need to ensure that it does not introduce new attack vectors.
Specifically, we have identified two potential denial-of-service
attack vectors and hardened the primitive against them.
Total residency attacks. Different from stateless, IP-based
routing, Poise keeps state in the FullConn table. Therefore,
an attacker could initiate many new connections and try to
a) overwhelm the FullConn table and b) constantly involve
the switch CPU to install new entries. Although the enter-
prise network can easily prevent spoofing, such attacks are
still feasible by varying the source port and the protocol ID.
Therefore, Poise maintains the number of active connections
per enterprise IP, and controls the growth of the FullConn
table. In addition, the Poise control plane periodically scans
through the FullConn table and expires inactive entries (us-
ing hardware support) to make room for new connections.
Cache eviction attacks. The above algorithm defends against
a malicious attacker that generates many connections to over-
whelm the FullConn table. However, an attacker can also
launch targeted DoS attacks without initiating a suspiciously
large number of connections. Specifically, she could send
context packets more frequently than usual, and try to evict
cache entries from Cache that are mapped to the same bucket.
Although the attacker may not know the hash seed, therefore
cannot predict who would be the victim of the attack, she
could degrade the performance of the connection that shares
the same hash entry, if one exists. To prevent such attacks,
we enhance the cache eviction strategy. When replacing an
old entry eo with a new entry en, we check whether these two
entries are from the same source IP. If so, we immediately
replace the entries. If not, we opportunistically perform the
replacement. By doing so, we limit the amount of damage an
attack can cause by sending frequent context packets.
6 Orchestrating Poise
Next, we explain how we orchestrate the Poise in-network
primitive using a centralized controller, and describe the client
module that runs on the mobile devices for context collection.
The Poise controller. Poise has a centralized controller that
hosts the compiler and distributes the generated data plane
programs to the switches. Unlike an SDN controller, which
actively makes decisions on behalf of the data plane, the Poise
controller is not involved in packet processing, so it does not
pose any software bottleneck. The main controller runs in a
remote server, and uses well-defined RPC calls to communi-
cate with programmable switches’ local control planes. Each
switch has a local control plane that runs on the switch CPUs,
and it configures the switch data plane by installing match/ac-
tion table entries, loads new switch programs, and serves as
the primary logging component of the system.
The Poise client module. Our client module PoiseDroid is
installed at BYOD devices to collect context information and
embed it into packets. PoiseDroid does not require modi-
fication of existing Android apps, but rather acts as a pre-
positioned kernel module. Since most Android smartphones
disallow users to load other kernel modules, PoiseDroid can-
not be removed or modified by mobile malware. When the
device connects to the enterprise network, our module uses
TOTP [77] for authentication, although we note that Poise
can be integrated with other types of authentication. Figure 7
shows the architecture of PoiseDroid with three submodules.
The context submodule. It collects context information from
the Android system services [104] using usermode-helper
APIs [35, 68], and it registers a virtual device to redirect the
context data to our kernel module. The information to be
collected is specified by a generic BYOD client configuration,
which includes a) app information, such as UIDs of active
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Usermode
Helper API
Context Sub-module Network Sub-module
Sensor Information 
Collector
System Information 
Collector Packet Monitor
Context Tagger
User SpaceV\VWHPOD\HU Kernel Space (kernel layer)
Android 
System Services
(e.g., location)
Netfilter
Kernel 
SocketVirtual
Device
LSM-based Security Sub-module
LSM-based Guard Extended LSM
Figure 7: The architecture of the PoiseDroid client module.
apps, b) system information, such as screen light status, and c)
device status, such as accelerometer and gyroscope readings.
Note that the network may only use a subset of such context
information for decision making.
The protection submodule. It protects the registered virtual
device, the system tools (e.g., dumpsys), and the system ser-
vices using LSM hooks in Android kernel [42,78]. It monitors
invocations of selected system calls, such as ptrace(), open(),
mprotect() and chown(), and prevents any other processes to
write false data to these protected components.
The network submodule. It crafts and sends special context
packets with signals needed for the enterprise policies, using a
frequency specified in the configuration. When an app opens
a new socket, or when an existing socket sends packets after
being dormant for a while, it also generates a context packet.
7 Evaluation
In this section, we describe the experimental results obtained
using our Poise prototype. Our experiments are designed to
answer four research questions: a) How well does the Poise
compiler work? b) How efficiently can Poise process the
security contexts inside the network? c) How well does Poise
scale to complex policies? d) How much overhead does the
Poise client incur on mobile devices? and e) How does Poise
compare with traditional SDN-based security?
7.1 Prototype implementation
We have implemented the Poise prototype using 4442 lines of
code in C/C++ and Python, and will release the source code to
the community. The Poise compiler is implemented in C++,
using Bison 2.3 as the syntax parser, and Flex 2.5.35 as the
lexer. It can generate switch programs in P4 for the Tofino
hardware. The PoiseDroid client module is implemented in C
as a pre-positioned kernel module on Linux 3.18.31. It extends
the default LSM framework, SEAndroid, to implement the
protection submodule. For the evaluation, PoiseDroid runs
on a Pixel smartphone with a Qualcomm Snapdragon 821
MSM8996 Pro CPU (4 cores) and Android v7.1.2. The Poise
control plane is implemented in Python, and runs as part
of the control plane software suite for the Tofino switch. It
manages the match/action table entries and reconfigures the
data plane programs. It can also be configured to invoke the
hardware-based packet generator on the Tofino chip to send
traffic at full linespeed, which we have used to test the latency
and throughput of Poise.
7.2 Experimental setup
We conducted our experiments on a hardware testbed with
one Wedge 100BF Tofino switch and two servers. The Tofino
switch has a linespeed of 100 Gbps per port, and 32 ports
overall, achieving an aggregate throughput of 3.2 Tbps when
all ports are active. Each server is equipped with a six-core
Intel Xeon E5-2643 CPU, 16 GB RAM, 1 TB hard disk, and
four 25 Gbps Ethernet ports, which collectively can emulate
eight forwarding decisions (one per server port). The servers
are connected to the Tofino switch using breakout cables from
the 100 Gbps switch ports to the 25 Gbps server Ethernet
ports. At linespeed, the testbed should achieve full 100 Gbps
bandwidth per switch port.
On the first server, one of its ports is configured to be an
enterprise server, and other ports are configured to emulate
a DPI device, a traffic scrubber, and a logger, respectively.
The other server functions as an enterprise client. The mobile
traces are first collected from our Pixel smartphone, and then
“stretched” to higher speeds to be replayed. The replay can
be initiated from a) the enterprise client, or b) the hardware
generator for Poise at linespeed. We have performed func-
tionality tests on both environments, although most of the
reported results are obtained from the hardware testbed.
7.3 Compiler
We start by evaluating the performance of the Poise compiler
and its generated programs.
Compilation speed. In order to understand the performance
of our compiler, we measured the time it took to generate
switch programs for each of the seven policies. We found that
compilation finished within one second across all policies. P1
and P3 took slightly more time than the rest, because they
involve more context fields and our compiler needs to generate
more logic for header processing.
Generated P4 programs. The generated P4 programs for
the policies have 855-975 lines of code, which are signifi-
cantly more complex than the original policy programs that
only contain a few lines of code. The programs can support a
maximum of 1 million connections. (SilkRoad [73] reports
a maximum of 10M connections in datacenters and switch
memory ten times larger than our low-end Tofino switch; we
have therefore scaled down the number of connections pro-
portionally.) The most important takeaways are a) utilization
for all types of resources is low, and b) policy P4 requires
relatively more ALUs due to the monitor update logic. The uti-
lization for SRAM (used for exact match) is roughly 43%, for
TCAM (used for longest-prefix match) is below 1.1%, and for
VLIWs (Very Long Instruction Words, used for header modi-
fications) is below 7%. In other words, Poise leaves plenty of
resources on the switch to support other functionalities.
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7.4 In-network processing overhead
Next, we turn to evaluate the overhead of Poise in terms of
packet processing latency and switch throughput.
Packet processing latency. Poise adds to the overhead of
packet processing, since it needs to check packet context and
update its tables to maintain per-flow state. To quantify this
overhead, we have tested the latency for Poise to process a) a
context packet, b) a data packet, and compared them with c)
the latency for directly forwarding a non-Poise packet without
any processing. Figure 8 shows that for all tested policies, the
additional latency is 88 nanoseconds for processing data pack-
ets, and 100.4 nanoseconds for processing context packets. In
an enterprise network where the round-trip delays are on the
order of milliseconds, such a small extra latency is negligible.
Switch throughput. Next, we measured the throughput per
switch port. Since the linespeed of the port is very high, we
used the hardware packet generator instead of the servers for
stress testing. The generator ingested mobile traces collected
from our phone, and stretched the trace to be 100 Gbps. Fig-
ure 9 shows the per-port throughput for all policies. As we can
see, although there is additional processing delay in Poise, the
pipelined nature of the switch hardware makes it achieve full
bandwidth nevertheless. In other words, Poise leverages pro-
grammable data planes to achieve linespeed programmability,
a key goal that we have designed for.
7.5 Scalability
Next, we evaluate how Poise scales to complex policies. We
note that the “number of policies” is an inexact metric, as
policies may perform different numbers of checks on different
numbers of context types. Therefore, our methodology is to
instantiate a large number of “unit policies”, each of which
only performs a single check on a single context. We then
use the compiler to compose them together, and analyze the
complexity of the composed policy in two dimensions: a) the
number of checks per context, and b) the number of context
types. For instance, consider the following unit policies:
if match (time >10) then fwd(mbox)
if match (time >15) then drop
if match (lib==1.0.2) then fwd(server)
We say that the composed policy has two context types and
performs three checks—1.5 checks per context on average.
Number of range checks. Poise compiles each range check
into a match/action entry, so the number of checks a switch
can suppprt depends on its available memory. We first mea-
sured the maximum number of checks Poise can perform on
a single context, by asking the compiler to compose more and
more unit policies until the compilation failed. We found that
our switch can support 1.2 million concurrent checks, which
are spread across 5 hardware stages (memory in other stages
are taken by the 1M connections). High-end Tofino switches
have ten times as much memory [73]; which would allow
proportionally many concurrent checks.
Number of context types. Poise compiles each context type
into a match/action table, so the number of context types is
bottlenecked by the number of tables that a switch can support.
We increased the variety of context types (e.g., time, library
version) from one to the maximum before compilation failure,
and for each data point, we measured the maximum number
of checks Poise can perform per context. We found that each
of the 5 stages can support 8 context tables, so Poise supports
a maximum of 40 context types. The number of checks per
context decreases as we added more context types, and the
lowest number is 21k checks per context (Figure 10a). High-
end switches have 2–3 times as many hardware stages, so they
would be able to support 80–120 context types.
Overhead. We define a “baseline” to be the latency and
throughput for a unit policy, where a context packet traverses
the hardware stages exactly once without recirculation. A
packet with k context types would recirculate d k5e times, since
every traversal would match 5 tables, one in each available
stage. At the maximum, Poise supports 8 recirculation for 40
context types, leading to a latency of 6µs (Figure 10b), which
is still orders of magnitude lower than typical enterprise RTTs
(ms). Recirculation also causes extra traffic overhead. As
Figure 10c shows, the maximum recirculation traffic over-
head is 8.8Gbps for the switch. Since switches have dedicated
pipelines to handle recirculation traffic, regular switch ports
can still forward traffic at linespeed.
Discussion. One might also wonder how many devices Poise
can support. However, the “number of devices” is also an
inexact metric, as Poise supports per-device policies simply
by including the device ID as a context type. Therefore, sup-
porting per-device policies merely reduces the number of total
context types by one, from 40 to 39. The number of unique
checks Poise can support—or the number of device IDs—is
21k with 39 context types. As another dimension of constraint,
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Figure 10: Poise can perform 1.2 million concurrent range checks for a single context, or 21k concurrent range checks for a
maximum of 40 context types. Context packets with more than 5 context types need to be recirculated multiple times; Poise
supports a maximum of 8 recirculations, which leads to 6µs latency and 8.8 Gbps additional traffic in a dedicated recirculation
pipeline. Data packets are not affected by policy complexity, as they simply look up the decisions from the connection table.
assuming each device may launch 1k concurrent connections,
then Poise would support a maximum of 1M/1k=1k devices.
7.6 Client overhead
We now evaluate the overhead of the client module, using the
vanilla Android without PoiseDroid as the baseline system.
CPU overhead. We tuned the frequency at which the client
module sends context packets, and measured the CPU over-
head for each frequency. In each trial, we uploaded a video
file of 1.73 GB to a remote FTP server using the mobile app
AndFTP [1], and measured the CPU overhead as collected
from the /proc/loadavg file. In a naïve design where Poise-
Droid tags every packet with context information, the CPU
overhead is as much as 11%. With an optimized design where
the client module tags one packet with context per second,
the CPU overhead is drastically reduced to 1.3%.
Traffic overhead. Next, we tested the traffic overhead due to
the context packets. This experiment assumes four context
fields (16 bytes). We found that, at one context packet per
second, the traffic overhead is less than 0.01%, a negligible
amount.
Battery overhead. We used PCMark [37], a battery life
benchmark tool to test smartphones and tablets, to quantify
the amount of battery overhead. PCMark tests capture a wide
variety of activities, such as browsing, video playback, photo
editing, writing, and data manipulation. In the beginning of
the experiment, the phone was charged with full capacity
(100%), and the tests ran until the battery dropped to less
than 20%. The overall overhead across activities introduced
by PoiseDroid is only 1.02%, and even for the activities that
introduce the highest overhead (i.e., writing), the overhead is
only 2.87%.
Overall benchmark. Next, we used CF-Bench, a comprehen-
sive benchmark tool designed for multicore mobile devices,
to quantify the overall overheads of PoiseDroid. This tool can
further measure the overheads introduced by native code, Java
code, and an overall benchmark score, where higher scores
mean better performance. PoiseDroid only introduces 5%, 4%,
and 5% additional overhead for the native, Java, and overall
scores.
7.7 Poise vs. OpenFlow-based SDN
Last but not least, we compare the paradigm of programmable
in-network security, as embodied in Poise, against the
paradigm of OpenFlow-based SDN security, in terms of a) re-
silience to control plane saturation attacks [90], and b) agility
in security posture change. As we motivated in §3, one key ad-
vantage of Poise over traditional SDN security solutions is the
avoidance of software-based packet processing on a remote
controller, because Poise uses programmable data planes to
directly process context information in the hardware fast path.
Setup. We set up a Floodlight v1.2 SDN controller on a sep-
arate server, and configured other servers to use the controller
using OpenFlow as implemented in OpenvSwitch v2.9.2.
We implemented our example policies (P1-P7) as software
“SDN apps” in the controller. These apps listen for client con-
text updates, and push OpenFlow rules to the clients for access
control. This closely mirrors the setup in state-of-the-art secu-
rity solutions based on OpenFlow-based SDN [62, 81, 90].
Control plane saturation attacks. We launched attacks with
different strengths, as measured by the number of new con-
nections per second [90]. As Figure 11 shows, since each new
connection triggers a PacketIn event at the controller, the
central controller was completely inundated with an attack
strength of 1M connections per second. During the attack, con-
current legitimate clients were not able to establish new con-
nections (99%+ connection requests from legitimate clients
were dropped; the rest experienced a latency 122× higher
than normal). Poise, however, paints a completely different
picture—although new connections will trigger the installa-
tion of match/action entries from the switch CPU, they are
simultaneously added to the hardware cache at linespeed, so
its performance stays almost constant during the attacks.
Defense agility attacks. We quantify the defense agility of a
security system by measuring δ, the time it takes to change
its security posture (e.g., access control decision) after seeing
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Figure 11: Poise is resilient to control plane saturation attacks.
Attack strength is measured by the number of new connec-
tions (or context changes for existing connections) per second.
New connections trigger PacketIn and FlowMod events, and
context changes trigger FlowMod events.
a new context packet. In OpenFlow-based SDN, this incurs a
round-trip time delay for the context packet to reach the con-
troller and for the controller to push new OpenFlow rules via
FlowMod messages. We found that, depending on the network
load, the agility of the baseline system is δ=5 ms–2.47 s. In
comparison, Poise directly processes context changes on the
fast path, achieving δ< 500 ns in all cases, which is three to
seven orders of magnitude more agile.
This lag in adjusting security posture results in a window
of vulnerability that can be easily exploited by an attacker.
To demonstrate this, we have launched an attack as follows:
a) the attacker launches a control plane attack in order to
inflate δ; b) it then goes through a context change and sends
an illegal request to the server; this request would eventually
be blocked when the OpenFlow rules are populated from the
controller to the client, but this decision change is delayed
due to the attack; and c) as a result, the insecure request is
incorrectly accepted by the enterprise server and access is
granted to this attacker. We then repeated the same attack to
Poise, and found that it successfully blocked all such requests.
Summary. These experiments demonstrate that Poise’s abil-
ity to change security posture at linespeed brings about signif-
icant security benefits. Compared to traditional SDN security
solutions, the paradigm of programmable in-network security
not only increases the resilience to control plane saturation
attacks, but also drastically boosts the defense agility.
8 Related Work
SDN/NFV security. SDN/NFV-based solutions for enterprise
security started with SANE [48] and Ethane [47]. Recent
followup work also include PSI [105] that uses virtualized
middleboxes for security, FortNox [84] that supports role-
based authorization, Bohatei [53] that defends against DDoS
attacks, PBS [62] that uses an SDN-like design for security
enforcement, PivotWall [81] and OFX [92] that perform in-
formation flow control using software controllers, and Cloud-
Watcher [88] that provides security monitoring as a service.
Existing work has also considered new attack vectors in
SDNs [63, 90, 91, 103], such as control plane saturation at-
tacks [90]. In comparison, Poise leverages programmable data
planes for linespeed security, increasing the defense agility
and resilience to control plane saturation attacks.
Context-aware security. Security researchers have recog-
nized the need for context-aware security to support fine-
grained, dynamic policies. Barth et al. [43] propose a logic
framework for contextual integrity. Recent work has devel-
oped various applications leveraging this concept. Contex-
IoT [65] analyzes UI activities, app information, and con-
trol/data flow information, and prompts users for runtime
permissions. FlowFence [54] runs applications in sandboxes
and enforces information flow control across IoT applications.
PBS [62] uses SDN software switches for BYOD security.
Yu et al. [106] sketch a vision for using network function
virtualization for context-aware IoT security. DeepDroid [98]
traces IPC and system calls to achieve fine-grained security.
Compared to existing work, Poise designs a network primitive
for security enforcement, and has an end-to-end framework
for specifying, compiling, and enforcing declarative policies.
Policy languages. Most domain-specific languages for net-
working [40, 44, 75, 85, 86, 97, 105, 107] are not targeted at
security. Policy languages for network security also exist, but
we are not aware of an existing language that can support
context-aware policies on programmable data planes. For
instance, PSI [105] uses finite state machines to specify secu-
rity policies, but it assumes that the policies are implemented
by general-purpose virtual machines; PBS [62] assumes a
traditional SDN environment. Poise builds upon an existing
SDN language (NetCore [75]), but adapts it for enforcing
context-aware security on programmable data planes.
Programmable data planes. Poise builds upon the emerging
trend of using data plane programmability [45, 46, 93] for in-
network computation, e.g., load balancing [70], network mon-
itoring [79], key-value cache [67, 71], and coordination [66],
but it focuses on a very different goal: security. The closest to
our work is a recent position paper [76], but it neither has a
full system implementation nor evaluation.
9 Conclusion
We have described Poise, a system that can enforce context-
aware security using a programmable, efficient, in-network
primitive. In Poise, administrators can express a rich set of
policies in a high-level language. Our compiler then compiles
the policies down to switch programs written in P4. These
programs run inside modern switches with programmable
data planes, and can enforce security decisions at linespeed.
Our evaluation shows that Poise has reasonable overheads,
and that compared to OpenFlow-based defense, it is highly
agile and resilient to control plane saturation attacks.
13
References
[1] AndFTP. http://www.lysesoft.com/products/
andftp/.
[2] Android for Work. https://www.android.com/en
terprise/employees/.
[3] Aruba 220 series access points. https:
//www.securewirelessworks.com/datashee
ts/Access-Points/DS_AP220Series.pdf.
[4] Barefoot Tofino. https://www.barefootnetworks
.com/technology/#tofino.
[5] The benefits and risks of BYOD. https://goo.gl/y
m9ATg.
[6] Blackberry EMM. https://www.blackberry.com
/us/en/solutions/enterprise-mobility-man
agement-emm.
[7] Bring your own risk with BYOD. https://goo.gl
/bn1rN4.
[8] BYOD: A global perspective. https://goo.gl/BTr
Sm4.
[9] BYOD: Mobile devices threats and vulnerabilities. ht
tps://goo.gl/phTav6.
[10] Cavium XPliant. https://www.cavium.com/xplia
nt-ethernet-switch-product-family.html.
[11] Cisco nexus 3400 series switches. https:
//www.cisco.com/c/en/us/products/switc
hes/nexus-3000-series-switches/models-co
mparison.html#~tab-nexus3400.
[12] End node. https://goo.gl/D99C39.
[13] How to solve the end node problem. https://goo.
gl/9wWqJr.
[14] IBM Mobile: BYOD. https://goo.gl/zafGxN.
[15] IBM opens up smartphone, tablet support for its work-
ers. https://goo.gl/WBn3vP.
[16] IEEE 802.1ae: MAC security. https://1.ieee802.
org/security/802-1ae/.
[17] Intel FlexPipe. https://www.intel.com/conten
t/www/us/en/products/network-io/ethernet
/switches.html.
[18] Market reports. https://goo.gl/25SX7K.
[19] The P4 language repositories. https://github.com
/p4lang.
[20] The rise and risk of BYOD. https://www.druva.co
m/blog/the-rise-and-risk-of-byod/.
[21] Samsung BYOD solutions. https://goo.gl/GmZ1i
o.
[22] Samsung Knox. http://www.samsung.com/global
/business/mobile/solution/security/samsung
-knox.
[23] Securing your weakest link: Your mobile devices. ht
tps://goo.gl/Z769MG.
[24] Security configuration guide: Access control lists,
Cisco IOS XE Release 3S. https://goo.gl/zTJaUL.
[25] Symantec EMM. https://www.symantec.com/con
tent/dam/symantec/docs/data-sheets/endpo
int-protection-mobile-for-emm-en.pdf.
[26] A technical report on TEE and ARM TrustZone.
https://community.arm.com/developer/ip-p
roducts/processors/b/processors-ip-blog/
posts/a-technical-report-on-tee-and-arm-
trustzone.
[27] Top 21 companies in the BYOD market. https://go
o.gl/MuRr66.
[28] Verified Boot: Android Open Source Project.
https://source.android.com/security/verifi
edboot/.
[29] VMware Airwatch. https://www.air-watch.com/
capabilities/enterprise-mobility-managem
ent/.
[30] What is BYOD and why is it important? https://go
o.gl/H71Nji.
[31] IEEE 802.1x remote authentication dial in user service
(RADIUS) usage guidelines, RFC 3580. 2003. https:
//www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3580.
[32] Nox. https://github.com/noxrepo/nox, 2012.
[33] Beacon. https://www.sdxcentral.com/project
s/beacon/, 2013.
[34] Pox. https://noxrepo.github.io/pox-doc/ht
ml/, 2017.
[35] dumpsys. https://developer.android.com/stud
io/command-line/dumpsys, 2018.
[36] OpenDaylight. https://www.opendaylight.org/,
2018.
14
[37] Pcmark for android benchmark. https:
//play.google.com/store/apps/details?i
d=com.futuremark.pcmark.android.benchmark,
2018.
[38] P. Aditya, R. Sen, P. Druschel, S. Joon Oh, R. Benenson,
M. Fritz, B. Schiele, B. Bhattacharjee, and T. T. Wu.
I-pic: A platform for privacy-compliant image capture.
In Proc. MobiSys, 2016.
[39] A. Alzubaidi and J. Kalita. Authentication of smart-
phone users using behavioral biometrics. IEEE Com-
munications Surveys& Tutorials,, 18, 2016.
[40] C. J. Anderson, N. Foster, A. Guha, J.-B. Jeannin,
D. Kozen, C. Schlesinger, and D. Walker. NetKAT:
Semantic foundations for networks. In Proc. POPL,
2014.
[41] N. Apthorpe, Y. Shvartzshnaider, A. Mathur, D. Reis-
man, and N. Feamster. Discovering smart home Inter-
net of Things privacy norms using contextual integrity.
Proceedings of the ACM on Interactive, Mobile, Wear-
able and Ubiquitous Technologies (IMWUT), 2, 2018.
[42] M. Backes, S. Bugiel, S. Gerling, and P. von Styp-
Rekowsky. Android security framework: Extensible
multi-layered access control on android. In Proc. AC-
SAC, 2014.
[43] A. Barth, A. Datta, J. C. Mitchell, and H. Nissenbaum.
Privacy and contextual integrity: Framework and ap-
plications. In Proc. IEEE Symposium on Security and
Privacy, 2006.
[44] R. Beckett, R. Mahajan, T. Millstein, J. Padhye, and
D. Walker. Don’t mind the gap: Bridging network-
wide objectives and device-level configurations. In
Proc. SIGCOMM, 2016.
[45] P. Bosshart, D. Daly, G. Gibb, M. Izzard, N. McKe-
own, J. Rexford, C. Schlesinger, D. Talayco, A. Vah-
dat, G. Varghese, and D. Walker. P4: Programming
protocol-independent packet processors. ACM SIG-
COMM CCR, 44(3), 2014.
[46] P. Bosshart, G. Gibb, H.-S. Kim, G. Varghese, N. McK-
eown, M. Izzard, F. Mujica, and M. Horowitz. Forward-
ing metamorphosis: Fast programmable match-action
processing in hardware for SDN. In Proc. SIGCOMM,
2013.
[47] M. Casado, M. J. Freedman, J. Pettit, J. Luo, N. McK-
eown, and S. Shenker. Ethane: Taking control of the
enterprise. In Proc. SIGCOMM, 2007.
[48] M. Casado, T. Garfinkel, A. Akella, M. Freedman,
D. Boneh, N. McKeown, and S. Shenker. SANE: A
protection architecture for enterprise networks. In Proc.
USENIX Security, 2006.
[49] D. Dang-Pham and S. Pittayachawan. Comparing in-
tention to avoid malware across contexts in a BYOD-
enabled Australian university: A protection motivation
theory approach. Computers & Security, 48, Feb. 2015.
[50] N. Dautenhahn, T. Kasampalis, W. Dietz, J. Criswell,
and V. Adve. Nested kernel: An operating system
architecture for intra-kernel privilege separation. In
Proc. ASPLOS, 2015.
[51] S. Eberz, K. B. Rasmussen, V. Lenders, and I. Marti-
novic. Evaluating behavioral biometrics for continuous
authentication: Challenges and metrics. In Proc. Asi-
aCCS, 2017.
[52] M. Ehatisham-ul-Haqa, M. A. Azama, U. Naeemb,
Y. Amina, and J. Looc. Continuous authentication of
smartphone users based on activity pattern recognition
using passive mobile sensing. Journal of Network and
Computer Applications, 109, 2018.
[53] S. K. Fayaz, Y. Tobioka, V. Sekar, and M. Bailey. Bo-
hatei: Flexible and elastic DDoS defense. In Proc.
USENIX Security, 2015.
[54] E. Fernandes, J. Paupore, A. Rahmati, D. Simionato,
M. Conti, and A. Prakash. FlowFence: Practical data
protection for emerging IoT application frameworks.
In Proc. USENIX Security, 2016.
[55] D. F. Ferraiolo, D. R. Kuhn, and R. Chandramouli.
Role-Based Access Control. Artech House, 2007.
[56] D. F. Ferraiolo, R. Sandhu, S. Gavrila, D. R. Kuhn,
and R. Chandramouli. Proposed NIST standard for
role-based access control. ACM Transactions on Infor-
mation and System Security (TISSEC), 3, 2001.
[57] N. Foster, R. Harrison, M. Freedman, C. Monsanto,
J. Rexford, A. Story, and D. Walker. Frenetic: A net-
work programming language. In Proc. ICFP, 2011.
[58] Y. Fratantonio, C. Qian, P. Chung, and W. Lee. Cloak
and dagger: From two permissions to complete control
of the UI feedback loop. In Proc. IEEE S&P, 2017.
[59] C. K. Georgiadis, I. Mavridis, G. Pangalos, and R. K.
Thomas. Flexible team-based access control using
contexts. In Proc. SACMAT, 2001.
[60] D. Harkins. Simultaneous authentication of equals:
A secure, password-based key exchange for mesh net-
works. In Proc. SensorComm, 2008.
15
[61] C.-Y. Hong, S. Kandula, R. Mahajan, M. Zhang, V. Gill,
M. Nanduri, and R. Wattenhofer. Achieving high uti-
lization with software-driven WAN. In Proc. SIG-
COMM, 2013.
[62] S. Hong, R. Baykov, L. Xu, S. Nadimpalli, and G. Gu.
Towards SDN-defined programmable BYOD (bring
your own device) security. In Proc. NDSS, 2016.
[63] S. Hong, L. Xu, H. Wang, and G. Gu. Poisoning net-
work visibility in software-defined networks: New at-
tacks and countermeasures. In Proc. NDSS, 2015.
[64] S. Jain, A. Kumar, S. Mandal, J. Ong, L. Poutievski,
A. Singh, S. Venkata, J. Wanderer, J. Zhou, M. Zhu,
J. Zolla, U. Hölzle, S. Stuart, and A. Vahdat. B4: Expe-
rience with a globally-deployed software defined WAN.
In Proc. SIGCOMM, 2013.
[65] Y. J. Jia, Q. A. Chen, S. Wang, A. Rahmati, E. Fer-
nandes, Z. M. Mao, and A. Prakash. ContexIoT: To-
wards providing contextual integrity to appified IoT
platforms. In Proc. NDSS, 2016.
[66] X. Jin, X. Li, H. Zhang, N. Foster, J. Lee, R. Soule,
C. Kim, and I. Stoica. NetChain: Scale-free sub-RTT
coordination. In Proc. NSDI, 2018.
[67] X. Jin, X. Li, H. Zhang, R. Soulé, J. Lee, N. Foster,
C. Kim, and I. Stoica. NetCache: Balancing key-value
stores with fast in-network caching. In Proc. SOSP,
2017.
[68] M. T. Jones. Invoking user-space applications from the
kernel. https://www.ibm.com/developerworks/l
ibrary/l-user-space-apps/index.html, 2018.
[69] L. Jose, L. Yan, G. Varghese, and N. McKeown. Com-
piling packet programs to reconfigurable switches. In
Proc. NSDI, 2015.
[70] N. Katta, M. Hira, C. Kim, A. Sivaraman, and J. Rex-
ford. HULA: Scalable load balancing using pro-
grammable data planes. In Proc. SOSR, 2016.
[71] M. Liu, L. Luo, J. Nelson, L. Ceze, A. Krishnamurthy,
and K. Atreya. IncBricks: Toward in-network compu-
tation with an in-network cache. In Proc. ASPLOS,
2017.
[72] N. McKeown, T. Anderson, H. Balakrishnan,
G. Parulkar, L. Peterson, J. Rexford, S. Shenker,
and J. Turner. OpenFlow: Enabling innovation in
campus networks. ACM SIGCOMM Computer
Communication Review, 38, 2008.
[73] R. Miao, H. Zeng, C. Kim, J. Lee, and M. Yu. SilkRoad:
Making stateful layer-4 load balancing fast and cheap
using switching ASICs. In Proc. SIGCOMM, 2017.
[74] C. Monsanto, N. Foster, R. Harrison, and D. Walker.
A compiler and run-time system for network program-
ming languages. In Proc. POPL, 2012.
[75] C. Monsanto, J. Reich, N. Foster, J. Rexford, and
D. Walker. Composing software-defined networks.
In Proc. NDSI, 2013.
[76] A. Morrison, L. Xue, A. Chen, and X. Luo. Enforcing
context-aware BYOD policies with in-network security.
In Proc. HotCloud, July 2018.
[77] D. M’Raihi, S. Machani, M. Pei, and J. Rydell. Rfc
6238-totp: Time-based one-time password algorithm.
tools.ietf.org, 2011.
[78] A. Nadkarni and W. Enck. ASM: A programmable
interface for extending Android security. In Proc.
USENIX security, 2014.
[79] S. Narayana, A. Sivaraman, V. Nathan, P. Goyal,
V. Arun, M. Alizadeh, V. Jeyakumar, and C. Kim.
Language-directed hardware design for network per-
formance monitoring. In Proc. SIGCOMM, 2017.
[80] M. Nauman, S. Khan, X. Zhang, and J.-P. Seifert. Be-
yond kernel-level integrity measurement: Enabling re-
mote attestation for the Android platform. In Proc.
International Conference on Trust and Trustworthy
Computing, 2010.
[81] T. OConnor, W. Enck, W. M. Petullo, and A. Verma.
PivotWall: SDN-based information flow control. In
Proc. SOSR, 2018.
[82] B. Parducci. eXtensible Access Control Markup Lan-
guage (XACML) specification. 2005.
[83] S. G. plc. Synchronized security: Best-of-breed
defense that’s more coordinated than attacks.
https://www.sophos.com/en-us/medialibrary/
gated-assets/white-papers/sophos-security-
heartbeat-wpna.pdf.
[84] P. Porras, S. Shin, V. Yegneswaran, M. Fong, M. Tyson,
and G. Gu. A security enforcement kernel for Open-
Flow networks. In Proc. HotSDN, 2012.
[85] M. Reitblatt, M. Canini, A. Guha, and N. Foster. Fat-
tire: Declarative fault tolerance for software-defined
networks. In Proc. HotSDN, 2013.
[86] C. Schlesinger, M. Greenberg, and D. Walker. Con-
current NetCore: From policies to pipelines. In Proc.
ICFP, 2014.
[87] Y. Shao, X. Luo, and C. Qian. Rootguard: Protecting
rooted android phones. IEEE Computer, 47(6), 2014.
16
[88] S. Shin and G. Gu. Cloudwatcher: Network secu-
rity monitoring using OpenFlow in dynamic cloud net-
works (or: How to provide security monitoring as a
service in clouds?). In Proc. ICNP, 2012.
[89] S. Shin, P. Porras, V. Yegneswaran, M. Fong, G. Gu,
and M. Tyson. Fresco: Modular composable security
services for software-defined networks. In Proc. NDSS,
2013.
[90] S. Shin, V. Yegneswaran, P. Porras, and G. Gu. AVANT-
GUARD: Scalable and vigilant switch flow manage-
ment in software-defined networks. In Proc. CCS,
2013.
[91] R. Skowyra, L. Xu, G. Gu, T. Hobson, V. Dedhia,
J. Landry, and H. Okhravi. Effective topology tamper-
ing attacks and defenses in software-defined networks.
In Proc. DSN, 2018.
[92] J. Sonchack, A. Aviv, E. Keller, and J. Smith. Enabling
practical software-defined networking security appli-
cations with OFX. In Proc. NDSS, 2016.
[93] H. Song. Protocol-oblivious forwarding: Unleash the
power of SDN through a future-proof forwarding plane.
In Proc. HotSDN, 2013.
[94] W. Tolone, G.-J. Ahn, and T. Pai. Access control in
collaborative systems. ACM Computing Surveys, 37,
2005.
[95] N. Ulltveit-Moe and V. Oleshchuk. Enforcing mobile
security with location-aware role-based access control.
Security and Communication Networks, 9, 2016.
[96] VMware. Next generation security with VMware NSX
and Palo Alto Networks VM-series. In White Paper,
2013.
[97] A. Voellmy, A. Agarwal, P. Hudak, N. Feamster, S. Bur-
nett, and J. Launchbury. Don’t configure the network,
program it! Domain-specific programming languages
for network systems. In Proc. SIGCOMM, 2010.
[98] X. Wang, K. Sun, Y. Wang, and J. Jing. Deepdroid:
Dynamically enforcing enterprise policy on Android
devices. In Proc. NDSS, 2015.
[99] X. Wang, T. Yu, O. Mengshoel, and P. Tague. Towards
continuous and passive authentication across mobile
devices: an empirical study. In Proc. WiSec, 2017.
[100] Z. Wang, Z. Qian, Q. Xu, Z. M. Mao, and M. Zhang.
An untold story of middleboxes in cellular networks.
In Proc. SIGCOMM, 2011.
[101] R. Ward and B. Beyer. BeyondCorp: A new approach
to enterprise security. USENIX ;login:, 39, 2014.
[102] Wi-Fi Alliance introduces Wi-Fi Certified WPA3
security. https://www.wi-fi.org/news-events/
newsroom/wi-fi-alliance-introduces-wi-fi
-certified-wpa3-security.
[103] L. Xu, J. Huang, S. Hong, J. Zhang, and G. Gu. At-
tacking the brain: Races in the SDN control plane. In
Proc. USENIX Security, 2017.
[104] R. Ye. Android System Programming: Porting, cus-
tomizing, and debugging Android HAL. Packt Publish-
ing, 2017.
[105] T. Yu, S. K. Fayaz, M. Collins, V. Sekar, and S. Seshan.
PSI: Precise security instrumentation for enterprise
networks. In Proc. NDSS, 2017.
[106] T. Yu, V. Sekar, S. Seshan, Y. Agarwal, and C. Xu. Han-
dling a trillion (unfixable) flaws on a billion devices:
Rethinking network security for the Internet-of-Things.
In Proc. HotNets, 2016.
[107] Y. Yuan, D. Lin, R. Alur, and B. T. Loo. Scenario-based
programming for SDN policies. In Proc. CoNEXT,
2015.
[108] N. Zahadat, P. Blessner, T. Blackburn, and B. Olson.
BYOD security engineering: A framework and its anal-
ysis. Computers & Security, 55, Nov. 2015.
17
